Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 51
Issue 3 Symposium: The Ohio Constitution Then and Now

Article

2004

The Ohio Constitution on the Occasion of Its Bicentennial
Kevin Francis O'Neill
Cleveland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Kevin Francis O'Neill, The Ohio Constitution on the Occasion of Its Bicentennial, 51 Clev. St. L. Rev. 333
(2004)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

FOREWORD: THE OHIO CONSTITUTION ON THE OCCASION
OF ITS BICENTENNIAL
KEVIN FRANCIS O’NEILL1
This symposium issue of the Cleveland State Law Review publishes the papers
that were presented at a conference marking the bicentennial of the Ohio
Constitution.2 That conference, held here at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law in
April 2003, examined the history and assessed the vitality of our state constitution.
The conference was conceived and its planning was supervised by our Dean, Steven
H. Steinglass, who has devoted significant scholarly attention to the Ohio
Constitution.3 In light of my own endeavors in state constitutional law, both as a
lawyer4 and as a scholar,5 I gladly assisted Dean Steinglass in organizing the
conference. In the paragraphs that follow, I briefly summarize each of the
contributions to this symposium. Those papers cover a broad range of topics —
from Ohio constitutional history and interpretation to race and equal protection,
education and tort reform, separation of powers and the one-subject rule.
We begin where the conference began: with a keynote address by a state
supreme court justice who is known and respected as much for her scholarly writings
as for her judicial opinions — Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. Chief Justice Abrahamson provides the perfect introduction, tracing
the rise, decline, and resurrection of state constitutional independence over the
course of our nation's history. She identifies the origins of that resurrection and
describes how it has been dubbed the “New Judicial Federalism.” Her remarks
culminate with some insights regarding the future direction and vigor of state
constitutional jurisprudence. She foresees a change of focus in state constitutional
claims, shifting from the rights of criminal defendants to the protection of property
and economic rights. This sea change may prompt a role reversal by current critics
1

Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State
University. For guiding this symposium issue into print, special thanks go to George Zilich,
the editor-in-chief of our Law Review, and to Holli Goodman and April Mixon of the Law
Review staff.
2
The Ohio Constitution — Then and Now: An Examination of the Law and History of the
Ohio Constitution on the Occasion of Its Bicentennial, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University (Apr. 24-25, 2003).
3

See, e.g., STEVEN H. STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE (forthcoming 2005) (Greenwood Press).
4
See Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 68 Ohio St. 3d 221, 626 N.E.2d 59 (1994) (invoked
Ohio Constitution's Free Speech Clause — Article I, Section 11 — in unsuccessful effort to
obtain right of access for speech activities in the common areas of privately-owned shopping
malls); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, No. 92CVH01-528, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1 (Ohio
C.P. May 27, 1992) (persuading trial court to hold that Ohio Constitution affords greater
protection for reproductive freedom than the U.S. Constitution), rev’d, 89 Ohio App. 3d 684,
627 N.E.2d 570 (1993), dismissed, 68 Ohio St. 3d 1420, 624 N.E.2d 194 (1993).
5

See Kevin Francis O’Neill, The Road Not Taken: State Constitutions as an Alternative
Source of Protection for Reproductive Rights, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1993).

333

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004

1

334

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:333

and proponents of New Judicial Federalism, causing the former to applaud and the
latter to rue any departure from federal constitutional norms. She concludes on a
note of caution, observing a willingness by the Rehnquist Court to inject itself into
state constitutional claims.
With Chief Justice Abrahamson having set the stage  by sketching the nature,
role, and significance of state constitutions  we commence our examination of the
Ohio Constitution. Our initial focus is on Ohio constitutional history. Here we have
contributions from two authors: Barbara A. Terzian and Jonathan L. Entin.
Terzian takes us from 1802 to the present, through two state constitutions and
four constitutional conventions. She shows how the crucible of history shaped and
reshaped the Ohio Constitution  from early struggles, on the very threshold of
statehood, between Jeffersonian Republicans and Federalists; to the pressures
exerted in their respective eras by Abolitionists, Progressives, and Prohibitionists; to
the quests for suffrage by blacks and women; to the economic impact of the Civil
War and the growing industrialization of subsequent decades. Terzian performs this
survey with careful attention to the political dynamics at each of Ohio’s
constitutional conventions  in 1802, 1850-51, 1873-74, and 1912. She paints her
picture with illuminating quotations from the letters and speeches of the convention
delegates who forged and amended Ohio’s Constitutions.
Entin focuses on the early history of race and equal protection under the Ohio
Constitution. He observes that in 1802  long before the United States adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment, with its guarantee of equal protection, in 1868  the Ohio
Constitution featured an equality guarantee that drew on the natural rights principles
embodied in the Declaration of Independence. He carefully examines a number of
Ohio Supreme Court decisions from the Nineteenth Century that involved racial
issues. In the process of deciding those cases, he observes, the court developed a
jurisprudence that, although jarring to modern sensibilities, was in some respects
surprisingly progressive for its time. Moreover, the reasoning employed in those
cases is considerably less offensive than that of the U.S. Supreme Court in cases
raising similar issues. By the end of the century, however, the Ohio Supreme Court
had largely abandoned the effort to develop a distinctive jurisprudence of equality,
deferring instead to the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Entin sees in this Nineteenth Century example some parallels to the
Ohio Supreme Court’s treatment of the state bill of rights in the late Twentieth
Century. He identifies the court’s Nineteenth Century retreat from independence as
foreshadowing the court’s Twentieth Century discomfort with New Judicial
Federalism.
Entin’s concluding observations serve as the ideal transition to our next group of
articles. We shift here from the history of the Ohio Constitution to its interpretation
by the Ohio Supreme Court. Specifically, the focus here is on the methods of state
constitutional interpretation that the Ohio Supreme Court has employed during the
era of New Judicial Federalism. How has the court responded when asked to
construe language in the Ohio Constitution that is similar or identical to language in
the federal Constitution previously interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court? Does it
perform a truly independent reading of the state constitutional text, consulting the
intentions of the Ohio framers and seeking guidance from Ohio’s history, or does it
conveniently adopt the federal approach to construing the analogous clause in the
U.S. Constitution? On this important topic we have contributions from three authors:
Robert F. Williams, Richard B. Saphire, and Marianna Brown Bettman.
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Williams, a pre-eminent authority on state constitutional law, observes that the
current wave of state constitutional independence has been underway since the
1970s, and that the Ohio Supreme Court, by professing to join the movement in
1993, is a relative newcomer. In the years since 1993, he observes, the court’s
interpretive methodology has alternated between two approaches: “reflective
adoptionism” and “prospective lockstepping.” Under the former approach, a state
court acknowledges the possibility of different state and federal outcomes, considers
the arguments in that specific case, and then, on balance, tends to adopt the federal
approach in analyzing the state provision. Under the latter approach, the state court
announces that not only in the instant case, but also in the future, it will interpret the
state clause in accordance with federal analysis. Williams concludes that the Ohio
Supreme Court should be commended for recognizing, at least in the abstract, that
the state constitution is a document of independent force. It must be borne in mind,
he writes, that New Judicial Federalism has only recently arrived in Ohio, that the
Ohio Supreme Court has not yet settled upon a definitive method of interpretation,
and that lawyers and scholars still have time to present the court with alternative
approaches stressing state constitutional independence.
Saphire provides a detailed review and critique of the Ohio Supreme Court’s
interpretive methodology since 1984. This examination, superb in itself, is rendered
all the more valuable by Saphire’s inclusion of two other discussions  one placing
the Ohio experience in a larger historical context, the other probing the legitimacy
and limits of New Judicial Federalism. Saphire concludes that the Ohio Supreme
Court’s commitment to state constitutional independence has been marked by
inconsistency and ambivalence. This trend will continue, he suggests, until the court
develops and articulates a theory of Ohio constitutional interpretation  something
that it has so far completely failed to do. Such a theory would have to provide
answers to questions like: When is the text sufficiently ambiguous that a judge may
look beyond the words? To what extent may judges consult historical sources,
contemporary sources, and policy considerations when construing the text? To what
extent and in what ways should they adopt approaches to interpretation that allow for
greater or lesser degrees of judicial discretion? In the end, Saphire, like Williams,
believes that lawyers and scholars can play a constructive role in suggesting answers
to these questions and thereby promoting the independence of the Ohio Constitution.
Bettman analyzes Ohio Supreme Court decisions construing the Speech, Press,
Search and Seizure, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clause analogues of the Ohio
Constitution. Here in Ohio, she concludes, New Judicial Federalism remains in its
infancy. The Ohio Supreme Court is still struggling with the fundamentals of state
constitutional interpretation. It remains heavily dependant on federal methodology
when construing analogous provisions of the state constitution. Bettman gives us the
unique perspective of a law professor who previously served as an Ohio appellate
court judge. This perspective sensitizes her to the current political make-up of the
Ohio Supreme Court. Today’s court, she observes, is far more conservative than the
1993 tribunal that proclaimed Ohio’s embrace of New Judicial Federalism. Thus,
there are strong political reasons to suppose that, at least for the time being, the court
will not be taking any long strides toward state constitutional independence.
We turn now from questions of interpretation to separation of powers. On this
topic we offer three articles. The first (authored by Curtis Rodebush) provides a
critical analysis of separation of powers under the Ohio Constitution. The second
(authored by Michael E. Solimine) examines the justiciability doctrines that prevail
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in Ohio courts. The third (authored by Stephanie Hoffer and Travis McDade) looks
at the Ohio Constitution’s one-subject rule.
Rodebush has two aims, and he weaves them together with such skill that each
complements the other. Reviewing the Ohio Supreme Court’s performance in
deciding separation-of-powers cases, he critiques that performance while offering a
preferred method of analyzing any separation-of-powers issue. Drawing upon recent
scholarship, Rodebush identifies two distinct approaches to separation-of-powers
analysis  “formalism” and “functionalism”  and, canvassing the full range of
separation-of-powers scenarios, he shows how one approach or the other is best
suited to resolving a particular conflict.
Solimine focuses on principles of justiciability  specifically, the standing and
political question doctrines  as imposing separation-of-powers restraints on the
judicial branch. He shows that in several recent cases, the Ohio Supreme Court has
departed from federal doctrine and lowered the thresholds of justiciability  making
it easier for litigants in Ohio courts to establish standing and to avoid dismissal under
the political question doctrine. While acknowledging that Ohio courts are not bound
by federal law on these issues, Solimine examines the historical, institutional, and
policy grounds for departing from federal norms. After an exhaustive analysis of the
standing doctrine, he concludes that the federal approach remains optimal and that
Ohio courts should continue to follow it. But as to the political question doctrine, he
arrives at the opposite conclusion. That doctrine, he observes, has weaker roots in
both federal and Ohio jurisprudence and its application is fraught with ambiguity.
Accordingly, Solimine concludes that the Ohio Supreme Court correctly declined to
use the political question doctrine as a basis for resolving the recent school-funding
litigation.
Hoffer and McDade reveal the seismic shift in the Ohio Supreme Court’s
treatment of the one-subject rule. That rule  set forth in Article II, Section 15(D)
of the Ohio Constitution  provides that “[n]o bill shall contain more than one
subject.” Its purpose is to prevent the packaging of several unrelated bills, none of
which commands majority support, into one bill, thereby converting several
minorities into one majority. As originally construed by the Ohio Supreme Court,
the one-subject rule afforded no basis for judicial review. It merely prescribed a
legislative norm  like the number of times a bill must be read aloud  and its
enforcement should be left to the legislative branch. From this modest debut, the
one-subject rule has been transformed into a source of enormous judicial power and
discretion. This metamorphosis is recounted and critiqued with great precision by
Hoffer and McDade. They conclude by applying the one-subject rule, in its virile
new form, to legislation recently enacted by the Ohio General Assembly. In the
process, they demonstrate that the rule’s new reach poses separation-of-powers
concerns, unduly magnifying the judicial power vis-à-vis the legislative branch.
We turn, finally, from the separation of powers to two hot-button issues in Ohio:
school choice and tort reform. Molly O’Brien and Amanda Woodrum authored the
school choice article, while James T. O’Reilly contributed the piece on tort reform.
O’Brien and Woodrum approach the school choice controversy by going back to
first principles. They investigate the origin and meaning of the “common school”
ideal that is embedded in the education clause of the Ohio Constitution. That clause
 Article VI, Section 2  requires the general assembly to create and fund “a
thorough and efficient system of common schools,” and it concludes with the
admonition that “no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive
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right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state.” That provision was
drafted and adopted by the delegates to Ohio’s 1851 constitutional convention.
Through a painstaking examination of Ohio’s early history and the 1851 convention
debates, the authors demonstrate that the term “common school,” as used in Article
VI, Section 2, had a clear and specific meaning to the convention delegates. That
meaning had been etched into the public mind through the efforts of educational
activists who campaigned vigorously through the 1830s and 40s for the
establishment of free, universal schooling. Those activists used the term “common
school” to refer specifically to a non-sectarian, publicly funded school where
children of all classes and backgrounds would be educated together. This is what the
Ohio Constitution means by “common schools,” argue the authors. It is this type of
school, and none other, they argue, for which public funding is authorized under the
Ohio Constitution. Thus, they conclude, efforts by school choice proponents to
secure public funding for privately-run sectarian schools directly conflict with the
“common school” ideal that is enshrined in Ohio’s education clause.
O’Reilly examines Ohio tort reform from the ominous perspective of electoral
fundraising for Ohio Supreme Court candidates. Though he concludes that tort law
justice is not for sale in Ohio, he demonstrates the disquieting extent to which
judicial candidates are selected and funded based on their approach to product
liability, medical liability, and employer tort liability. In 2002, the candidates who
won election to the Ohio Supreme Court spent about two dollars for every vote they
received. A new justice begins a six-year term with the knowledge that one
incumbent needed a $758,000 reelection fund for the fight to retain her seat in 2002.
O’Reilly explores how the pressures of raising so much money can drive a candidate
into the arms of corporate political action committees. The Procter & Gamble Good
Government Committee, for example, gave candidates over $200,000 in 2002 alone.
O’Reilly follows this exploration with a detailed analysis of recent tort decisions by
the Ohio Supreme Court, an analysis that reveals the great extent to which tort
reform is affected by the court’s interpretation of the Ohio Constitution. In
performing this analysis, O’Reilly recounts the court’s ongoing feud with the Ohio
General Assembly  and he inquires whether shifting political majorities on the
court will produce zigzagging outcomes, thereby sacrificing stare decisis and
doctrinal coherence.
In closing, we very much hope that lawyers and judges here in Ohio will find this
symposium issue useful in advancing claims and deciding issues under the Ohio
Constitution. To that end, we have departed from law review citation rules in the
way that we have cited Ohio cases. Rather than citing only to the Northeast
Reporter, as those rules require, we have added parallel citations to the official Ohio
reporter. Since Ohio courts require citation to the official Ohio reports, we hope that
our parallel citations will facilitate the use of this symposium issue by Ohio’s bench
and bar.
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